The government has suppliers that it may not know and may never see

▸ Less insight into suppliers' security practices

▸ Less control over business practices

▸ Increased vulnerability to adversaries

"Scope of Supplier Expansion and Foreign Involvement" graphic in DACS www.softwaretechnews.com Secure Software Engineering, July 2005 article "Software Development Security: A Risk Management Perspective" synopsis of May 2004 GAO-04-678 report "Defense Acquisition: Knowledge of Software Suppliers Needed to Manage Risks"

ICT components enable our Digital / Information Age

- **Dependencies on technology are greater then ever**

-- **Possibility of disruption/sabotage is greater than ever because hardware/software is vulnerable**

--- **Loss of confidence alone can lead to stakeholder actions that disrupt critical business activities**

Internet users in the world: 1,766,727,004
E-mail messages sent today: 215, 674, 475, 422
Blog Posts Today: 458, 972
**Google searches Today: 2,302,204,936**

Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources — Sectors

- Agriculture and Food
- Energy
- Transportation
- Chemical Industry
- Postal and Shipping

- Water
- Public Health
- Telecommunications
- Banking and Finance
- Key Assets

Physical Infrastructure — Physical Assets

- Railroad Tracks
- Highway Bridges
- Pipelines
- Ports
- Cable
- Fiber

- Reservoirs Treatment plants
- Farms
- Food Processing Plants
- Hospitals
- Power Plants
- Production Sites

- FDIC Institutions
- Chemical Plants
- Delivery Sites
- Nuclear power plants
- Government Facilities
- Dams

Cyber Infrastructure — Cyber Assets

Services
- Managed Security
- Information Services

Control Systems
- SCADA
- PCS
- DCS

Software
- Financial System
- Human Resource

Hardware
- Database Servers
- Networking Equipment

Internet
- Domain Name System
- Web Hosting

Who is behind data breaches?	**74%** resulted from external sources (+1%).
	20% were caused by insiders (+2%).
	32% implicated business partners (-7%).
	39% involved multiple parties (+9%).
How do breaches occur?	**7%** were aided by significant errors (<>).
	64% resulted from hacking (+5%).
	38% utilized malware (+7%.
	22% involved privilege misuse (+7%).
	9% occurred via physical attacks (+7%).

* Source – 2009 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report

Not only do we have an

increasingly

**Global-Interdependent Supply Chain,**

we also have a world of

Capabilities, that are

increasingly

Dependent on Globally Sourced ICT.

Custom

1982--------2012

COTS

Govt-SCRM-related Developments

- **CNCI-SCRM**   still alive & well

- **CNSS DIRECTIVE 505 on SCRM** from Committee on National Security Systems (FOUO)

- **NIST-IR 7622 & NIST 800-53 rev4** due soon   **(US.gov-only participates in SCRM WG2)**

  http://csrc.nist.gov/news_events/index.html

  NIST hosted Public-Private SCRM Workshop on 15-16 Oct2012

- **"IT Supply Chain: National Security-Related Agencies Need to Better Address Risks",**
  GAO-12-361, Mar 23

  http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-361

  both DOE & DOJ have now "stood-up SCRM Focal Points"

- **DODI 5200.mm on Trusted Systems & Networks…VERY NEAR PUBLICATION**

- **USD AT&L Memo on Program Protection Planning (PPP) July 2011**

- **Monthly TSN RoundTable Meetings & NEW Quarterly TSN/PP Executive Council Meetings**

Counterfeit Microelectronics---L&MR lead

Who is working this (DoD, US,gov, public-private, standards)
& NDAA'12 Section 818…upcoming NDAA'13 ?

- -Learn from Quality Assurance & Safety Critical Items Practices
- -Procurement & Acquisition-Contracts
- -Testing (life cycle doc, acceptance, follow-up analysis)
- -Reporting
- -WorkForce Development (training & education)
- -Standards

Software Assurance---AT&L-SE lead

Who is working this (DoD, US,gov, public-private, standards)
& NDAA'11 Section 932… upcoming NDAA'13 ?

- -Learn from Quality Assurance & Safety Critical Items Practices
- -Procurement & Acquisition-Contracts
- -Testing (life cycle doc, acceptance, follow-up analysis)
- -Reporting
- -WorkForce Development (training & education)
- -Standards

- **<u>Mini-SOAR / SOAR-lite effort</u>** deemed success w/o final report- (draft to be issued)- purpose was leader visibility & establish need for HW/SW-testing SOAR in FY13.

- **<u>FY13 SOAR PURPOSE</u>**: Provide state-of-the-art software, hardware, and integration information for Program Offices via "SOAR"-like product addressing security aspects for HW/SW components (with emphasis on acceptance testing &/or required test-documentation)… read as risk mitigation tools for incorporation in PPP.

Current Testing-SOAR Activity

- **SOAR on Security T&E of HW/SW**
  - ▸ ATL&CIO **baseline Testing SOAR** product initiated now with FY12$
    - —Product by October 2013
    - —Published in hardcopy via DTIC? by December 2013
    - —**Develop "document" in anticipation of being web-enabled**
  - ▸ ATL&CIO & NSA-CAS fund(s) updated for SOAR+ follow-on with FY13$
    - —Demonstrate product as **web-enabled digital media** capable of regular update and refresh with on-demand hard copy production
    - —Add annex/appendix on current DoD concerns; such as **mobility HW/SW security**, integrated T&E security extensions
    - —**Continue development of emerging immature content**; such as Integrity Test and Analyses (ITA) for sophisticated adversaries exploiting Supply Chain and other opportunities (including classified annex)

- **Vehicle to Execute**
  - ▸ FY12$ Contract-Task with IDA
  - ▸ FY13$- TBD